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ABSTRACT
As the Internet has grown, children’s lives have become increasingly intertwined with online
goods and services, which has raised concerns about their digital privacy and safety. This thesis
scrutinizes the economic and legal implications of Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA, “the Rule”), which regulates the data collection and retention policies of online
services to protect the privacy and safety of children. It examines selected enforcement actions,
proposed amendments, privacy policies and practices of platforms used as education technology
(“EdTech”), incorporating the concerns and opinions of industry experts. In doing so, this thesis
finds that COPPA has shortcomings in its methods of enforcement, compliance efforts, and the
legislation itself. This thesis concludes after an evaluation of the legislation and proposals to
update the Rule.
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INTRODUCTION
The Federal Trade Commission and the Development of COPPA
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC, “the Commission”) was established in 1914 to protect
consumers and promote competition with the enactment of the Federal Trade Commission Act
(FTC n.d.). In addition to establishing the Commission itself, the FTC Act empowers the
Commission to prescribe rules “which define with specificity acts or practices which are unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” within a defined scope of domestic
business (15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B)).
In June 1998, the Federal Trade Commission issued Privacy Online: A Report to Congress,
which assessed the effectiveness of self-regulation as a means of protecting consumer and
children’s privacy on the World Wide Web. In addition to providing an overview of the topic,
the report included a description of fair information practice principles, analysis of industry
association guidelines, and results from a survey of commercial websites.
While the Commission defined “widely-accepted” principles of fair information practices, it
stated that children have a “special status... accorded under the law” that was premised on “the
belief that children lack the analytical abilities and judgments of adults” (FTC 1998, p. 12). The
FTC claims that this status is exemplified in federal and state laws that protect children,
including those that ban sales of tobacco and alcohol to minors or require parental consent for
medical procedures (Id, p. 12). The Commission concluded that the fair information practice
codes do not address personal information collected from children; rather, they are applicable to
parents (Id, p. 12).
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Using the fair information practice codes, the Commission analyzed two sets of industry
association guidelines regarding collection and use of information from children (Id, p. 17-18).
The Commission found that there was inconsistency between the guidelines in their requirements
to provide notice to parents or obtain prior parental consent.
In its report, the FTC detailed results of a survey conducted in March 1998 of over 1,400
websites, of which 212 sites were directed to children (Id, p. 19). The FTC staff found that the
vast majority (eighty-nine percent) of the sites directed to children collected at least one type of
personal information, including name, e-mail address, postal address, telephone number, Social
Security Number, age, date of birth, gender, education, interests, hobbies, etc (Id, p. 31-32). The
Commission found that fewer than a quarter of the sites directed to children posted privacy
policies (Id, p. 35).
At the conclusion of the report, the Commission concluded that self-regulation was not effective
as a means of protecting children’s privacy and FTC found that it lacks authority to require firms
to adopt information practice policies (Id, p. 41). The Commission recommended to Congress to
develop legislation placing parents in control of the online collection and use of personal
information from their children (Id, p. 41-42). Thus, according to the Congressional Bill
introduced in the 105th Congress, COPPA directs the Federal Trade Commission to prescribe
regulations and require operators to follow fair information practices regarding the collection and
use of personal information from children. The FTC aimed to protect the privacy of children
online by putting parents in control of information collected online from children under 13 (FTC
1999). COPPA was signed into law in 1998 and took effect in 2000 (FTC 1999).
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COPPA
COPPA applies to websites and online services, including apps, to protect kids’ personal
information (FTC 2019). The Rule applies to sites directed to children under 13 as well as
general audience sites that have actual knowledge that they are collecting personal information
from kids that age (15 U.S.C. 6501–6505 2013).
Below are the provisions set forth in COPPA categorized by the fair information practice codes
as defined in Privacy Online.
Notice/Awareness
According to the Commission, without notice, a consumer cannot make informed decisions as to
whether and to what extent to disclosure personal information (FTC 1998, p. 7). In addition, the
Commission’s report states that notice is the most fundamental principle, and three of the other
principles (choice/consent, access/participation, and enforcement/redress) are only meaningful
when a consumer has notice of an entity’s policies and their rights (Id, p. 7). Moreover, the
Commission argues that notice should be unavoidable and understandable to be meaningful and
effective (Id, p. 8), though this is not a requirement of the Rule.
Section 312.4 of COPPA delineates the obligations of the operator to provide notice prior to
collecting, using, or disclosing personal information from children: “Such notice must be clearly
and understandably written, complete, and must contain no unrelated, confusing, or contradictory
materials” (2013). According to Part (b), “[a]n operator must make reasonable efforts, taking into
account available technology, to ensure that a parent of a child receives direct notice... including
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notice of any material change in the collection, use, or disclosure practices to which the parent
has previously consented.”
Section 312.4(c) then specifies the requirements of content of the notice for each of the following
scenarios: (1) Notice to Obtain Parent’s Affirmative Consent to the Collection, Use, or
Disclosure of a Child’s Personal Information, (2) Voluntary Notice to Parent of a Child’s Online
Activities Not Involving the Collection, Use, or Disclosure of Personal Information, (3) Notice to
a Parent of Operator’s Intent to Communicate with the Child Multiple Times, and (4) Notice to a
Parent In Order to Protect a Child’s Safety.
Choice/Consent
The FTC defines the second core principle, choice, as giving consumers options (such as opt-in
and opt-out) as to how personal information collected from them may be used, specifically
related to “secondary uses of information” (FTC 1998, p. 8). Secondary uses are uses beyond
those necessary to complete the contemplated transaction (Id, p. 8). Examples of secondary uses
include placing the consumer on the company’s mailing list to market additional products or
transferring information to third parties (Id, p. 8).
Section 312.5 of COPPA specifies the obligations of the operator to obtain verifiable parental
consent prior to collection, use, or disclosure of personal information from children. While
Section 312.5(b) specifies existing methods of obtaining verifiable parental consent, Section
312.12 allows interested parties to file a request for Commission approval of parental consent
methods not currently enumerated in Part (b) and Section 312.5(a)(3) allows safe harbor
programs approved by the Commission to use a parental consent method if the program
determines that the consent method meets the requirements of § 312.5(b)(1).
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In addition, COPPA specifies that an operator must give the parent the option to consent to the
collection and use of the child’s personal information without consenting to the disclosure of his
or her personal information to third parties (§ 312.5(b)), with a few exceptions (§ 312.5(c)). Such
exceptions include the cases in which an operator collects a persistent identifier and no other
personal information and either such identifier is used for the sole purpose of providing support
for the internal operations of the Web site or online service (§ 312.5(c)(7)) or the identifier is
collected from a user who affirmatively interacts with the operator and whose previous
registration with that operator indicates that such user is not a child (§ 312.5(c)(8)), both of
which also exempt operators from providing notice under § 312.4.
Section 312.7 prohibits operators from conditioning a child’s participation in a game, the
offering of a prize, or another activity on the child’s disclosing more personal information than is
reasonably necessary to participate in such activity.
Access/Participation
To provide informed consent to the retention and/or use of information collected from their
children, the FTC argues that parents need to be given access to the information collected from
their children, particularly if any of the information is collected prior to providing notice to the
parent (FTC 1998, p. 13).
In addition to requiring the operator to obtain verifiable parental consent, COPPA also specifies
the rights of a parent to review personal information provided by a child (§ 312.6). These rights
also include the opportunity at any time to refuse to permit the operator’s further use or future
online collection of personal information from that child, and to direct the operator to delete the
child’s personal information (§ 312.6(a)(2)).
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Integrity/Security
In 1998, the Commission defined integrity as addressing the accuracy of data, especially in the
contexts “involving decisions that impact on the child or family” (p. 13-14). However, in the text
of COPPA itself, integrity is mentioned in the context of protecting information from being
exposed more and longer than is necessary (§ 312.8).

Section 312.8 of COPPA requires operators to establish and maintain reasonable procedures to
protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity of personal information collected from
children. Section 312.8 also requires operators to take reasonable steps to release children’s
personal information only to service providers and third parties who are capable of maintaining
the confidentiality, security, and integrity of such information. Moreover, Section 312.10
prohibits operators from retaining personal information from a child for longer than is reasonably
necessary to fulfill the purpose for which the information was collected. Additionally, operators
must delete such information using reasonable measures to protect against unauthorized access
to, or use of, the information in connection with its deletion (§ 312.10).

Enforcement/Redress

In 1998, the Commission requested that trade associations and industry groups voluntarily
submit copies of their online information practice guidelines and principles to assess the status
and effectiveness of self-regulatory efforts of the time (p. 15). The FTC found in evaluating the
guidelines that the industry had not achieved widespread adherence (Id, p. 17). Moreover, the
Commission declared that an absence of enforcement mechanisms significantly weakens the
effectiveness of industry-promulgated guidelines as a self-regulatory tool, and it is especially
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true if member companies fail to voluntarily adhere to suggested policies (Id, p. 16). Again, at
the time, the Commission concluded that self-regulation was not effective as a means of
protecting children’s privacy and FTC found that it lacks authority to require firms to adopt
information practice policies (Id, p. 41).

The text of the federal legislation states that violations of COPPA are treated as a violation of a
rule defining an unfair or deceptive act or practice prescribed by the Federal Trade Act (§
312.10).

Section 312.11 creates the safe harbor program, which allows operators to apply to the
Commission for approval of self-regulatory program guidelines. Section 312.11 specifies the
criteria for approval of self-regulatory program guidelines; proposed safe harbor programs are
required to demonstrate that they (1) ensure operators provide substantially the same or greater
protections for children, (2) create an effective, mandatory mechanism for the independent
mechanism of subject operators’ compliance with the program guidelines, (3) enforce
disciplinary actions for subject operators’ non-compliance with self-regulatory program
guidelines.

The Pace of Technological Innovation and Integration
COPPA was initially enacted in 1998; however, the world has seen many changes since then,
such as substantial growth in Internet connected devices and online platforms. The first iPhone,
which combined the mobile phone with an Internet communications device and a multi-touch
display, was launched in January 2007 (Dowling, Kerris 2007). Following three years later, the
first iPad was launched in January 2010 (Evans, Smith 2010). “The facebook” (also known as
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Facebook, Meta) was launched in February 2004, within three years had over 30 million
registered users (Phillips 2007). At the time of its official release in December 2005, YouTube
was serving more than two million video views each day (Hosch 2022). Instagram was launched
in 2010 and within two years, it had 27 million users and was acquired by Facebook (aka Meta)
for one billion dollars in cash and stock (Blystone, Schmitt 2022). TikTok (a combination of
Musical.ly and Douyin) was launched initially in 2014 and within five years, it had amassed one
billion downloads worldwide and a year later, two billion downloads (Galer, Tidy 2020).
Additionally, TikTok, YouTube, and Meta (which encompasses both Facebook and Instagram)
all offer a “free” version of their service and their revenue-generating advertising is driven by
their data collected on their users, according to their data and privacy policies (TikTok 2021,
Google 2022, Facebook 2022, Instagram 2018). TikTok’s net US advertising revenue has been
forecasted to have grown over 184% in 2021 to $5.96 billion (Lukovitz 2022). In 2021, Meta
reported a net income of over $39 billion (Meta 2021), and as of 2022, Meta has a twenty-two
percent share of the nearly $250 billion US digital ad market (Lukovitz 2022). In 2020, YouTube
was reported to have made $15 billion solely from ad revenue (Alphabet 2020).
Given the development of business models that involve data collection, the rise of social media
platforms, the proliferation of smartphone technology with precise geolocation information, and
the use of behavioral advertising for children, the Rule was amended in 2013. According to
former FTC attorney Phyllis Marcus, “...the basic handy four-word summary... is that behavioral
advertising is covered under the revised rule from 2013” (FTC 2019). More specifically, the
Commission’s 2013 Statement of Basis and Purpose states that the amendments clarify
definitions of “operator”, “Web site or online service directed to children”, “personal
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information”, and “support for internal operations” (p. 3972). The statement specifically clarifies
that advertising networks that collect personal information from its visitors are included in its
definitions (Id, p. 3972). Additionally, personal information was clarified to include geolocation
information and persistent identifiers—such as cookies—that can be used to recognize a user
over time and across different websites or online services (Id, p. 3972). The amendment also
expanded the exceptions to the Rule’s notice and consent requirements in § 312.5(c), such as that
the Rule’s notice and parental consent requirements does not apply when an operator collects
only a personal identifier only to support the operator’s internal operations (Id, p. 3977).
Moreover, the term “internal operations” was redefined to make clear that none of the
information collected may be used or disclosed for behavioral advertising, though it also now
specifically includes many types of other activities, such as serving contextual advertising (Id, p.
3979).
Meanwhile, children’s lives have become increasingly integrated with mobile devices and social
media. According to a 2017 study by Common Sense Media, the percentage of 0- to 8-year-olds
with their own tablets has grown from less than one percent in 2011 to over forty percent in
2017. Not only have children become owners of their own mobile devices but they have also
established a presence on social media platforms. According to the 2019 FTC press release
regarding the Google and YouTube settlement, Google touted to companies such as Mattel and
Hasbro that YouTube was unanimously voted as the favorite website of kids 2-12, and over
ninety percent of tweens visit YouTube to watch videos.
In addition to being on social media platforms, a substantial number of children have been using
online educational resources. The COVID-19 pandemic, which reached the United States in
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January 2020 (CDC 2022), dramatically shifted children’s education to distance learning
(Mcelrath 2020). The vast majority of households (ninety-three percent) of households with
school-age children reported some form of distance learning during the pandemic (Mcelrath
2020). According to the United States Census Bureau’s Household Pulse Survey, about threequarters of people living with children (43 of 57 million) reported their kids using online
resources in May 2020 (US Census Bureau 2020).
The persistent growth of technology and online educational resources and young children’s vast
adoption of these tools continues to raise questions about the privacy policies and protections
currently in place.
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY
Motivated by the persistent growth of technology such as online educational resources and their
vast adoption by young children, this thesis answers one primary research question:
What are the implications and limitations of COPPA’s enforcement actions, compliance efforts
by education technology platforms, and the legislation itself?
To answer this question, this thesis uses two methods—interviews with industry experts and
legal analysis. Informed by the 2019 FTC workshop on COPPA, interview questions serve as
investigative efforts focused on learning more about additional concerns regarding COPPA, its
amendments, its effects, and its future. Interview responses have been incorporated within the
legal analysis. The legal analysis examines enforcement actions, privacy policies of online
platforms used as educational resources, and proposed amendments.
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Enforcement Actions
Background

To ensure COPPA compliance, the FTC and Attorneys General bring forth complaints. As of
March 2022, there have been at least 39 COPPA enforcement actions. As of March 2022, at least
half (22 of 39) COPPA complaints include a count of failing to obtain verifiable parental consent
for collecting children’s data (§ 312.5(a)). Almost 1 in 3 complaints (12 of 39) involve children’s
data and advertising, with the majority of those being directed at companies who disclosed
children’s personal information to third-party advertising platforms or allowed personal
information to be collected from their users under the age of 13.

Settlements typically involve a combination of civil penalties, enjoinment from future violations,
and reports on how the defendant will improve their practices. As of February 2022, the vast
majority (almost 90%) of COPPA cases have resulted in civil penalties, totaling almost $200
million. Of the $200 million, $170 million came from the 2019 settlement with YouTube, which
totals to a mere 1.133% of YouTube’s $15 billion ad revenue (Alphabet 2020).

This thesis analyzes Federal Trade Commission and the People of the State of New York v.
Google, LLC and YouTube, LLC (2019) and In the Matter of Miniclip S.A. (2020) by exploring
the statements and opinions issued by the Commission to determine the limitations of the
settlement action. Two additional cases (The State of New Mexico v. Google, LLC (2020) and
United States of America v. OpenX Technologies (2021)) are analyzed in later sections of this
thesis to supplement the remaining analysis.
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Federal Trade Commission and People of the State of New York v. Google, LLC and
YouTube, LLC (2019)

In 2019, Google, LLC and its subsidiary YouTube, LLC agreed to pay $170 million to settle
allegations by the FTC and the NY Attorney General for violations of COPPA (Case 1:19-cv02642). COPPA requires that certain websites and apps obtain parental consent prior to
collecting personal information from children, including cookies used for behavioral advertising.
These websites and apps include third parties serving behavioral ads if they have actual
knowledge that the content on the website with their advertisements is child-directed. The
complaint alleges multiple instances in which YouTube and Google had actual knowledge of
child-directed content and failed to obtain parental consent prior to collecting personal
information.

The FTC imposed a tripartite order in its 2019 settlement, requiring: 1) the companies pay $136
million and $34 million in civil penalties to the FTC and New York State, respectively, 2) the
companies to refrain from using or benefitting from the data previously collected from childdirected videos or channels, and 3) additional restrictions beyond COPPA, such as requiring the
companies to notify content creators of COPPA obligations.

According to its press release, the Commission voted 3-2 to authorize the complaint and the final
order (FTC 2019); former Chairman Joseph J. Simons and Commissioner Christine S. Wilson
issued a statement, while Commissioners Noah Joshua Phillips, Rohit Chopra, and Rebecca
Kelly Slaughter issued separate statements.
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The YouTube settlement and Commission statements reveal two primary issues with the
Commission’s method of enforcement actions: a) Enforcement actions of the Commission
further reinforce disparities between small and big businesses and b) The Commission is limited
by the settlement route.

Disparities between small and big businesses
According to Matecki, soon after the Rule was enacted, smaller websites began to feel the
increased costs of COPPA compliance, as they needed to hire legal teams to write
expansionary privacy policies and to enforce privacy requirements (2010, p. 382).
Moreover, Dona Fraser, Vice President of the Children’s Advertising Review Unit
(CARU), brought up similar concerns during the 2019 FTC workshop, stating that many
small app developers lack the infrastructure and money to comply with COPPA (p. 54).

The disparities between small and big businesses have been felt for years; however, the
enforcement action further reinforces this disparity. While the statement frames the
enforcement action as one that goes above and beyond (“borne by no other company”,
“significant judgment”, “far-reaching conduct relief”, etc.), the dissenting opinion of
Commissioner Chopra serves as a reminder of the disparities between smaller and bigger
companies. Commissioner Chopra argues that the enforcement action does not hold
YouTube and Google accountable to the same degree that small businesses are (7).
Commissioner Chopra states, “When small players and upstarts violate COPPA, the
companies pay dearly and the executives are investigated and, if liable, held personally
accountable” (7). For example, in the case of United States of America vs. Unixiz, Inc.,
Zhijun Liu, and Xichen Zhang (2019), these disparities are apparent. In 2019, Unixiz’s
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2.1 million users of its website (Id, p. 6) pales in comparison to the 1.9 billion users of
YouTube (Degenhard 2021). Moreover, Zhijun Liu and Xichen Zhang were listed as
Defendants both individually and as officers of UNIXIZ, Inc. (Case 5:19-cv-02222, p. 1)
while Commissioner Chopra stated that it was unclear whether YouTube and Google
CEOs or other senior executives had knowledge of or involvement in the company’s
COPPA violations. “Here, where a dominant incumbent engaged in widespread
violations, the company is paying a slice of their profits from wrongdoing and executives
avoid scrutiny” (7). The $170 million is a mere 1.133% of YouTube’s $15 billion ad
revenue (Alphabet 2020). As Commissioner Chopra suggests, this signals to the
marketplace that smaller businesses face disproportionate scrutiny.

The Limitation of Settlement
100% of the enforcement actions brought forth by the Commission have been settled
(Slaughter 2019, p. 3). However, given the complete absence of litigation, the
Commission is limited by and uninformed about its potential outcomes. According to the
statement of former Chairman Simons and Commissioner Wilson, the Commission must
consider whether the relief they are obtaining is equal to or better than what they could
reasonably obtain through litigation (2019, p. 4). Commissioner Wilson stated in the
2019 FTC Workshop that the FTC’s prosecutorial resources were “scarce” (2019). The
Commission believes the monetary penalty is better than what they would achieve after
litigation (Simons and Wilson, p. 4). However, as Commissioner Slaughter argued in her
dissenting opinion, the Commission has never litigated a COPPA enforcement action and
therefore has no informed basis on which to assess how a court would assess a civil
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penalty amount” (Id, p. 3). Hockey Hall of Famer Wayne Gretzky once said, “You miss
100% of the shots you don’t take.” As Gretzky insinuates, there are missed opportunities
in not trying. Without a single litigated enforcement action, the Commission lacks an
informed understanding of how a court might determine penalties.

In analyzing the YouTube settlement and related statements, this thesis finds two primary issues
with the Commission’s method of enforcement actions: a) Enforcement actions of the
Commission further reinforce disparities between small and big businesses and b) The
Commission is limited by the settlement route. The disparities between small and big businesses
may discourage smaller businesses from serving children, given the impact of both compliance
costs and more stringent enforcement actions. According to Harry Jho, founder of the Mother
Goose Club YouTube channel, small businesses may not be able to adapt to legislation and
enforcement action easily, resulting in fewer content creators and an overall loss of quality
content for kids. Moreover, until the Commission attempts to litigate an enforcement action, it
will continue to lack an informed basis upon which it can assess how a court would determine a
civil penalty.
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COPPA Compliance in EdTech
Background

Education technology (EdTech) is a massive market. According to the United States Department
of Commerce, the global market in 2020 was estimated to be worth nearly $90 billion and is
projected to grow at an annual compound rate of 19.9% from 2021 to 2028. Of the continents in
the global market, North America is the largest, which the Department attributes directly to the
size of the U.S. education sector. Moreover, education technology software has become
thoroughly integrated into children’s classrooms. According to PowerSchool and Discovery
Education, two providers of K-12 education technology platforms, they each serve
approximately 45 million students; similarly, EdTech provider Seesaw claims to be used by over
75% of schools in the US.

The sheer size and extent to which education technology has been integrated into the lives of
children raises additional privacy and safety concerns. According to a 2021 whitepaper published
by British security software company Sophos, independent researchers found that across 5,400
IT decision makers across 30 countries, the education sector experienced the highest level of
ransomware attacks, with 44% of respondents in these sectors reportedly being hit, notably
higher than the global average of 37%. Moreover, in 2018, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) issued a public service announcement to raise public awareness of cyber threat concerns.
According to the FBI, “[t]he US school systems’ rapid growth of education technologies
(EdTech) and widespread collection of student data could have privacy and safety implications if
compromised or exploited.” Additionally, the announcement states that malicious use of
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sensitive personal information could be used in social engineering, bullying, tracking, identity
theft, or other means for targeting children.
Given the sensitive nature and risks inherent in collecting and distributing children’s data, this
study investigates privacy policies, customer success stories, app store listings, and other
information to learn more about each platform’s COPPA compliance. In addition to summarizing
the personal information collected or accessed by each platform (Table 1), this study identifies
the methods by which different platforms used as education technology handle COPPA
compliance (Table 2, Figure 1). The platforms include communication tools, storage solutions,
education content providers, and learning management systems used by students and schools.
This study investigated the provided by the following platforms: Blackboard (first CourseInfo,
acquired by Blackboard LLC, acquired by Anthology), Box, BrainPOP, Discovery Education,
Dropbox, Duolingo, Eduphoria, Google Workspace for Education Fundamentals (formerly G
Suite for Education), ImagineLearning, Instructure, Kahoot, Khan Academy, Microsoft,
PowerSchool, Quizlet, Savvas, Seesaw, Writable, and Zoom. Eduphoria’s privacy policy was not
found on its website. All other references to privacy policies can be found in the References
section.
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Table 1: Personal Information Accessed or Collected by EdTech Platforms

Information category

Definition or examples of

Collected by

information

Account and contact

Name, email address, account

Blackboard, Box, BrainPOP,

information

credentials, course enrollment

Discovery Education,

information, phone number,

Dropbox, Duolingo, Google

graduation date, gender,

Workspace,

native language

ImagineLearning, Instructure,
Khan Academy, Microsoft,
PowerSchool, Quizlet,
Savvas, Seesaw, Writable,
Zoom

Application, enrollment,

Student ID, enrollment status,

Blackboard,

and financial aid

financial aid information

ImagineLearning, Instructure,

information

PowerSchool

Biometric signals

Collected from webcams

Duolingo

Chat and audio recordings

Virtual classroom sessions

Blackboard, Google
Workspace,
ImagineLearning, Microsoft,
PowerSchool, Seesaw, Zoom

Contacts

Address book contact

Dropbox, Google Workspace,

information

Microsoft, Quizlet, Zoom
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Content and activity

Coursework, comments,

Blackboard, Box, BrainPOP,

grades, feedback, audio

Discovery Education,

recordings, video recordings,

Dropbox, Duolingo, Google

recording metadata

Workspace,
ImagineLearning, Instructure,
Kahoot, Khan Academy,
Microsoft, PowerSchool,
Savvas, Seesaw, Writable

Cookies

Limited personal information, Blackboard, Box, BrainPOP,
IP address, usage data

Discovery Education,
Dropbox, Duolingo, Google
Workspace, Instructure,
Microsoft, Quizlet, Savvas,
Seesaw, Writable

Device information

Hardware model, operating

Blackboard, Box, Discovery

system and version, unique

Education, Dropbox,

device identifiers, network

Duolingo, Google

information, platform

Workspace, Instructure, Khan

information, system

Academy, Microsoft,

configuration information,

PowerSchool, Quizlet,

browser type, internet service

Seesaw, Zoom

provider, language
preferences, screen
resolution, and screen color
processing ability, viewfinder
size, script errors
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Information from third-

Name, email address, age,

Blackboard, Discovery

parties

gender, position, profile

Education, Google

picture, public social media

Workspace, Microsoft,

posts with matching

Quizlet, Seesaw, Writable

keywords and hashtags

Location data

Precise geolocation data, IP

Blackboard, Box, BrainPOP,

address

Discovery Education,
Dropbox, Google Workspace,
Instructure, Khan Academy,
Microsoft, PowerSchool,
Quizlet, Savvas, Seesaw,
Zoom

Lookalike audience identity

Identities of prospective

BrainPOP

customers collected via
advertising networks,
revealed when they click on
ads

Network information

Network usage statistics,

Duolingo

volume of network traffic

Notification reactions

Whether calls were answered,

Blackboard

whether voicemails were left

Payment, transactional

Credit card number, security

Blackboard, Box, Google

information

code, services purchased or

Workspace, PowerSchool,

subscribed to, billing address

Quizlet, Savvas
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Peripherals attached

Whether any external devices

Duolingo

are connected to the device
accessing the software

Pixel tags or web beacons

One pixel image used in

BrainPOP, Discovery

promotional content to track

Education, Dropbox, Google

the effectiveness of marketing Workspace, Quizlet, Savvas,

Support information

campaigns

Writable

Phone conversations, chat

Blackboard, Microsoft,

sessions, device information,

Seesaw

product information,
institution information

User journey information

Pages visited, content used,

Box, BrainPOP, Discovery

URL of the web page visited

Education, Duolingo, Google

prior to navigating to the site,

Workspace, Instructure,

scroll depth, user clicks, user

Kahoot, Khan Academy,

journey, mouse movements,

PowerSchool, Quizlet,

scrolling, typing

Savvas, Zoom
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Compliance Methods

In investigating the 19 platforms, this study finds that for the 18 platforms with privacy policies
publicly available, there are eight recurring methods used in attempt to comply with COPPA
(Table 2, Figure 1). Listed in order of most popular to least popular, the methods are as follows:
1) Schools as intermediaries, 2) Child-specific privacy policy or notice, 3) Actual knowledge
disclaimer, 4) Age-gate, 5) Age-specific product, 6) Third-party authorization, 7) Safe harbor
membership, 8) Access without an account.

In investigating the three most popular compliance methods, this thesis finds two additional
issues with COPPA: c) COPPA fails to empower minors as future decision-makers and d)
COPPA fails to meet its legislative intent in empowering parents.
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Table 2: Compliance Methods Used by EdTech Platforms

Compliance Method

Used by

Access without accounts

Discovery Education, Kahoot

Actual knowledge disclaimer

Blackboard, Box, Instructure, Khan
Academy, PowerSchool

Age-gate

Box, Discovery Education, ImagineLearning,
Savvas, Zoom

Age-specific product or experience

Duolingo, Khan Academy, Quizlet

Child-specific privacy policy or notice

Blackboard, Duolingo, Instructure, Kahoot,
Google Workspace, Khan Academy,
Microsoft, PowerSchool, Quizlet, Seesaw,
Writable, Zoom

Schools as intermediaries or agents

Blackboard, Box, BrainPOP, Discovery
Education, Dropbox, Google Workspace,
ImagineLearning, Instructure, Kahoot, Khan
Academy, Microsoft, PowerSchool, Savvas,
Seesaw, Writable

Safe harbor membership

PowerSchool, Quizlet

Third- party sign-in or authentication

BrainPOP, ImagineLearning, Instructure
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Figure 1: Popularity of Compliance Method
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Schools as Intermediaries

16 of 18 platforms require schools to serve as intermediaries. Learning management
system and communications technology companies such as Blackboard, Google
Workspace, and Zoom contract with schools to provide education technologies. COPPA
requires that operators obtain verifiable parental consent prior to collecting data from
children under 13 years of age for educational and commercial purposes. On one hand, in
its compliance FAQ, the FTC stated that a school can serve as an agent and provide
consent for the students on behalf of the parents in an educational and non-commercial
context (2020). On the other hand, the District Court ruled in State of New Mexico v.
Google LLC (2020) that a school can serve as an intermediary between a parent and the
operator when providing consent for data collection for commercial purposes.
The State of New Mexico v. Google, LLC (2020)
In February 2020, the Attorney General of New Mexico announced a lawsuit against
Google, LLC alleging Google’s conduct violates 1) COPPA, 2) the New Mexico Unfair
Practices Act, and 3) New Mexico common law (Case 1:20-cv-00143). In regards to the
COPPA violations, the plaintiff alleged that Google (1) failed to provide notice to parents
in stating the types of personal information it seeks to collect from the child, (2) any
notice provided by Google is not intended for the child’s parent and would not be
understood by a child under the age of 13, and (3) failed to obtain parental consent
authorizing it to collect and use minors’ personal sensitive information. The District
Judge ruled that the plaintiff did not demonstrate the plausibility of its claims, rather than
describing the case in detail, such that the plaintiff’s allegation of (1) inadequate notice
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failed to satisfy the Iqbal/Twombly requirement to allege sufficient factual matter. In
response to (2), the Judge noted that COPPA does not require that the notice be drafted
for the understanding of children under 13. The Judge rejected (3), as the Court agreed
with Google in that the State’s complaint does not allege that Google fails to provide
notice to schools, or that Google fails to obtain consent from schools, or that schools fail
to obtain consent from parents where required. Instead, the Judge sided with Google’s
claims that there was a distinction between agent and intermediary. While the COPPA
claims were dismissed with prejudice by the District Court Judge, the New Mexico
Attorney General filed an appeal and ultimately settled the aforementioned suit and
another with Google. The settlement resulted in the creation and funding of the Google
New Mexico Kids Initiative, which sets aside $3.8 million dollars to fund efforts to
promote education, privacy, and safety for New Mexico children.
COPPA’s Failure to Empower Young Children as Future Decision-Makers
In rejecting (2), the Judge noted the COPPA does not require that the notice be drafted
for the understanding of children under 13, which is true. However, in lacking this
requirement, COPPA fails to empower minors as future decision-makers. While the
Commission recognizes in Privacy Online that children deserve special protections, these
protections end at age 13 without any preparation when they are no longer included in the
Rule’s definition of “child” (Section 312.2).

Moreover, children under age 13 are using devices independently. Kabali et al. concluded
in their research that 350 young children in an urban, low-income, minority community
had almost universal exposure to mobile devices, and most had their own device by age 4
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(2015). According to Kabali et al., most 3- and 4-year olds used devices without help,
suggesting independent use.

If young children are not given preparation but are given devices without supervision,
then it is important that children are empowered to make decisions. As Privacy Online
suggests, effective notice enables individuals to make informed decisions (FTC 1998, p.
7). Although it is not currently a requirement that notice be drafted for the understanding
of children under 13, doing so will empower children with a better understanding of how
their data is being used, even after they are no longer under COPPA’s protections.

Operators are Excluding Parents From the Decision-Making Process
According to the FTC FAQ on COPPA compliance, “the school’s ability to consent for
the parent is limited to the educational context – where an operator collects personal
information from students for the use and benefit of the school, and for no other
commercial purpose” (FTC 2020). However, the District Judge sided with Google,
finding that FTC guidance does not prohibit schools from serving as an intermediary
between parents and online operators. On the Google Cloud COPPA Compliance page,
Google states, “Google contractually requires that schools using Google Workspace for
Education meet the parental consent requirements under COPPA. Our services can be
used in compliance with COPPA as long as a school has parental consent” (Google
2022).

While the 2020 District Court Order stated that the FTC does not prohibit schools from
serving as intermediaries, it is unclear whether Google’s policy follows the guidance set
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forth in the FTC’s compliance FAQ. In the same response that limits the school’s ability
to consent for the parent, the FTC states, “…operators should not state in Terms of
Service or anywhere else that the school is responsible for complying with COPPA, as it
is the responsibility of the operator to comply with the Rule” (FTC 2020). Google’s
policy states that it “contractually requires schools… to meet the parental consent
requirements under COPPA”, implying that schools are responsible for obtaining parental
consent.

In addition to shifting the responsibility of collecting verifiable parental consent onto the
schools, some privacy policies also state that schools are responsible for deciding how
personal data is used. According to Blackboard’s Privacy Statement, “This means that the
main responsibility for data privacy compliance lies with your institution as the ‘data
controller.’ It also means that your institution’s privacy statement governs the use of your
personal information (instead of ours)” (2021). By shifting the responsibility for data
privacy compliance onto institutions and indirectly obtaining verifiable parental consent,
operators are excluding parents from the decision-making process.
COPPA’s Failure to Meet Legislative Intent
By using schools as intermediaries, operators are displacing the responsibilities of
COPPA compliance, especially when 16 of 17 operators use schools as an intermediary.
According to the FTC’s 2017 workshop on EdTech and privacy, COPPA was enacted
with two goals in mind: “Allow parents to make informed choices about when children’s
personal information is collected, used, and disclosed online” and “Enable parents to
monitor their children’s interactions and help prevent them from risks of inappropriate
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online disclosures.” However, if schools are not required to give notice to parents
regarding data disclosure and consent that has been given, then COPPA fails to meet
these two goals.
Although parents can request to review and request the deletion of their children’s
personal information, operators are further displacing responsibilities by requiring that
parents contact their schools’ administrators. For example, Zoom’s Educational Privacy
Statement reads, “If you are a parent or student, please contact your school or other
educational organization to access any personal information, limit a student’s access to
Zoom Products features or services, or delete personal information or the student’s entire
profile” (2021). While parents are then able to contact the schools, the FTC recommends,
but does not require, schools to provide parents with a notice of the websites and online
services whose collection it has consented to on behalf of the parent under COPPA (FTC
2020). This is likely due to the fact that the Commission does not have jurisdiction over
non-profits, including public schools (FTC 2017).

That said, the FTC does have options that it can use to fulfill its originally intended goals.
Firstly, it can clarify that it is the responsibility of the operator to comply with COPPA,
rather than the responsibility of the school, as the Commission clearly states in its FAQ
(FTC 2020). For example, Blackboard’s Privacy Statement states, “...the main
responsibility for data privacy compliance lies with your institution...” (2021), which
implies that Blackboard is not responsible for data privacy compliance violates the
standards set by the FTC. Given that Blackboard is an EdTech company, rather than a
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non-profit, the FTC does have jurisdiction over the actions of the company and can
pursue an investigation under Section 6 of the FTC Act.

Secondly, the FTC can either recommend that Congress revise legislation to ensure that
operators are obtaining verifiable parental consent from parents to use their children’s
data for commercial purposes or prescribe rules under its own Section 57a authority (15
U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B)). The Commission published its Privacy Online report in 1998 to
encourage Congress to develop legislation placing parents in control of the online
collection and use of personal information from their children (41-42), finding that it
lacks authority to require firms to adopt information practice policies (41). Similarly, the
Commission can encourage Congress to revise legislation to reaffirm the original
legislative intent of protecting children’s privacy online and giving parents the power to
make informed decisions. Moreover, the Commission can prescribe its own rules “which
define with specificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
or affecting commerce”(15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B)).

Child-specific Privacy Policies and Actual Knowledge Disclaimers
COPPA requires that certain websites and apps obtain parental consent prior to collecting
personal information from children, including cookies used for behavioral advertising.
These websites and apps include third parties serving behavioral ads if they have “actual
knowledge” that the content on the website with their advertisements is child-directed.
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12 of 18 EdTech platforms have a separate privacy policy or notice specifically
addressing their practices regarding children’s data. For example, PowerSchool, a
provider of cloud-based software for K-12 education, has a separate section on its Privacy
Policy page (2022).
The Shortcomings of Actual Knowledge
Allowing sites to disclaim “actual knowledge” means the legislation fails to capture a
portion of sites used by children. As Finnegan notes, COPPA fails to explicitly define
what it means to have “actual knowledge” of underage users (2020, p. 831). However, the
Commission has promulgated that “an operator has actual knowledge of the user’s age if
the site or service asks for—and receives—information from the user that allows it to
determine the person’s age” (Id, p. 840). Moreover, according to its 2019 FAQ, the
Commission does not require operators to ask the age of visitors. However, according to
Finnegan, given that “actual knowledge” is only determined once the operator actually
asks for the user’s age, the lack of requirement has allowed Meta to evade having “actual
knowledge” of underage users (Id, p. 841).
Allowing sites to disclaim “actual knowledge” is especially problematic when operators
are misrepresenting their “actual knowledge.” While providing a separate privacy policy
is not inherently problematic, operators have provided contradictory information. For
example, PowerSchool’s Section F: “Children’s Privacy”, states in its second point,
“Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA). PowerSchool Products are not
directed to children under 13, and PowerSchool does not knowingly collect any
information from children under the age of 13.”
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While PowerSchool does provide additional notice and information regarding its data
collection, retention, and security protocols, PowerSchool should be careful not to
misrepresent its practices, as the FTC has taken enforcement action against OpenX
Technologies and YouTube LLC in relation to their disclaimer of COPPA and their
actual knowledge of collecting data from children. Moreover, according to Section 312.4,
the notice which is the obligation of the operator, “must contain no unrelated, confusing,
or contradictory materials.”
United States of America v. OpenX Technologies (2021)
In December 2021, advertising platform OpenX and the FTC entered a settlement
agreement for the platform’s violations of the FTC Act and COPPA (Case 2:21-cv09693). OpenX operates an advertising exchange that allows publishers of Web sites and
apps monetize their platforms by automating the auctioning of ad space on apps in realtime.
In paragraph 54 of the filed complaint, the case includes OpenX’s disclaimer in its
COPPA Notice: “OpenX does not engage in activities that require parental notice or
consent under the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA). If you believe that
OpenX has inadvertently collected information from a child under 13 that is subject to
parental notice and consent under COPPA, please contact OpenX using the contact
information below to request deletion of the information” (2021, 11). Although the notice
attempts to disclaim liability under COPPA, OpenX had actual knowledge that it had
collected personal data (including location information and persistent identifiers) from
children (10). Thus, OpenX was liable to comply with COPPA as an “operator.” In Count
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II: Deception of the complaint, OpenX was found to have misrepresented its COPPA
activities and practices, as it falsely represented that it does not engage in activities that
require parental notice or consent under COPPA. Apparently, it is not enough to simply
disclaim COPPA and offer the ability to request deletion in the case of accidental data
collection.
In § 312.2, COPPA defines “directed to children” as being “a commercial Web site or
online service, or portion thereof, that is targeted to children” (2013). While PowerSchool
claims that it does not knowingly collect any information from children under the age of
13, it offers PowerSchool Unified Classroom as “the leading K-12 learning management
system” (PowerSchool 2022). Moreover, it advertises that student “Ben” gets a unified
learning experience and that he can take assessments in the same place where he does
most of his other assignments, as well as get support from his teacher (PowerSchool
2022). Given that PowerSchool Unified Classroom is a K-12 learning management
system designed to be used by students to do their assignments and communicate with
their teachers, it is unclear how PowerSchool could not knowingly collect any
information from children under the age of 13. While OpenX was a general audience app
that misrepresented its liability under COPPA, PowerSchool is clearly an application
directed towards children if it is a K-12 management system, despite their disclaiming
liability under COPPA.

In addition to false claims that users could opt out of geolocation tracking and its
misrepresentation of its activities and practices related to children/COPPA, OpenX was
found to have collected personal information from children without consent and proper
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notice. More specifically, OpenX 1) failed to provide sufficient notice regarding its data
collected from children, 2) failed to provide direct notice to parents on the information it
collects from children, and 3) failed to obtain verifiable parental consent before any
collection or usage of personal information. In addition to being enjoined from violating
the FTC Act, OpenX will 1) pay a $2 million civil penalty (revised from $7.5 million due
to an inability to pay), 2) delete all ad request data it collected to serve targeted
advertisements, 3) implement a comprehensive privacy program to prevent future
COPPA violations, including re-reviewing apps periodically and tracking banned apps
and websites.

Operators should exhibit greater consistency between its privacy policy and promotional
content and exercise greater care before making disclaimers about “actual knowledge”,
especially given that 14 of 18 platforms advertised their products as being suitable for K12 audiences. While not all 14 platforms disclaim COPPA compliance and not all
operators who disclaim COPPA compliance are in violation of COPPA, operators should
be cautious to ensure that their disclaimers and their practices align in accordance with
the Rule. If the Commission allows operators to simply disclaim “actual knowledge” and
evade COPPA compliance as Instagram did for years (Finnegan 2020), then COPPA will
continue to fail to capture a portion of sites used by children. If COPPA fails to capture a
substantial portion of sites used by children, then it is no better than self-regulation.

By investigating the three most popular compliance methods, this thesis that c) COPPA fails to
empower minors as future decision-makers and d) COPPA fails to meet its legislative intent in
empowering parents.
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COPPA and Amendments
To further determine the implications and limitations of COPPA, especially in the legislation
itself, this thesis explores whether the legislation and its 2013 amendment addressed concerns of
past academic research. In addition, this thesis identifies the extent to which recently proposed
amendments address COPPA’s issues.
Pre-Amendment Legal Research Concerns
Prior to the Rule’s 2013 amendment, legal scholars criticized COPPA for the following reasons:
1) legal scholars considered it to be at odds with the First Amendment, 2) verification technology
was ineffective, and 3) COPPA compliance was too costly.
The Constitutionality of COPPA
Shortly after COPPA was enacted in 1998 and it came into effect in 2000, legal scholars
Warmund (2000, p. 212) and Hersh (2001, p. 1850) claimed that placing burdens upon
the constitutional right to commercial free speech can be problematic, both citing the
ruling of Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union et al. (1997).
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union et al (1997)
Two provisions of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996 sought to “protect
minors from harmful material on the Internet. Section 223(a)(1)(B)(ii) criminalized the
“knowing” transmission of “obscene or indecent” messages to any recipient under 18
years of age. Section 223(d) prohibited the “knowing” sending of displaying to a person
under 18 years of any message “that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory
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activities, or organs.” Sections 223(e)(5)(A) and 223(e)(5)(B) created affirmative
defenses to those who take in “good faith” actions to restrict access by minors to the
prohibited communications or access by requiring age proof. A number of plaintiffs filed
suit, challenging the constitutionality of Sections 223(a)(1) and (223)(d) (521 U. S. 844
1997). The District Court found entered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of
both challenged provisions, but Reno, the Attorney General of the United States (referred
to as “the Government” in the case), appealed the decision (Id, p. 844).
The court held that the CDA’s “indecent transmission” and “patently offensive display”
provisions abridge the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment because the
CDA was vague (Id, p. 844-845). Moreover, the court stated that its breadth was
unprecedented and that its “burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive
alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the Act’s legitimate purpose”, and
the Government failed to demonstrate otherwise (Id, p. 846).
Warmund and Hersh both draw parallels with Reno, stating that COPPA may be at odds
with the First Amendment because the burdens it places on free commercial speech.
However, it is important to note that the Reno court weighs the Act’s means of achieving
legitimate purposes with its burden on free commercial speech. A law that places burdens
on free commercial speech can pass strict scrutiny if it is narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of achieving that
objective (Legal Information Institute n.d.). According to Jim Dunstan, General Counsel
at TechFreedom, COPPA has never been challenged on First Amendment grounds. Thus,
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it remains unknown whether COPPA would withstand strict scrutiny; nevertheless,
COPPA is not unconstitutional simply due to any burden on free commercial speech.
In addition, the Reno court found that the precedents cited by the Government raised
doubts about the CDA’s constitutionality due to the differences in the laws and orders
upheld in those cases. These differences include that the CDA does not allow parents to
consent to their children’s use of restricted materials, is not limited to commercial
transactions, fails to provide any definition of “indecent”, neither limits its broad
categorical prohibitions to particular times nor bases them on an evaluation by an agency
familiar with the medium’s unique characteristics. However, in the case of COPPA,
many of these issues do not apply. The Rule allows parents to provide consent to data
collection (Section 312.5); the Commission has jurisdiction over commercial entities but
not non-profits (Section 312.2); the Rule defines specific scenarios in which it applies
(Section 312.2); and it is enforced by the Federal Trade Commission, which has
demonstrated its familiarity with consumer issues in publishing its Privacy Online report.
Therefore, many of the issues in precedents that made the CDA constitutionality suspect
do not apply to COPPA.
Lack of Effective Verification Technology

Legal researchers (Warmund 2000, Hersh 2001, and Matecki 2010) find that verification
technology is ineffective. According to Warmund, it is difficult to ensure that the person
who e-mails consent is the parent and not the child (2000, p. 208). Similarly, Hersh states
that asking a user to check a box stating that they are thirteen will not stop astute children
from accessing a Web page (2001, p. 1869). Matecki (2010) cites a 2007 report in which
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the FTC concluded that the Act and Rule acknowledged the lack of technology providing
a plausible means of age verification (p. 385). Moreover, the Commission stated in its
2019 FAQ that the Rule will not prevent children from misrepresenting their age to
register for general audience sites or online services whose terms of service prohibit their
participation.

Nevertheless, there have been new verification technologies that have been adopted since
COPPA’s enactment (Veratad 2022, FTC 2019). According to Don McGown, former
Chief Legal Officer in Business Affairs of the Pokemon Company International, the
company uses a verification technology provided by Veratad (FTC 2019). The solution
authenticates the age of a user based on the last four digits of an individual’s Social
Security Number, which costs about $0.35 per Application Programmable Interface (API)
call (FTC 2019). This solution is likely more effective in ensuring that consent is coming
from the parent themselves, rather than a child. However, Morgan Reed—the president of
the App Association—notes that these costs are felt for small developers (FTC 2019),
which contributes further to the difficulties of COPPA compliance costs.

Cost of COPPA Compliance

The same legal researchers believe that COPPA compliance is too expensive due to the
costs of obtaining parental consent and costs of hiring legal teams (Warmund 2000,
Hersh 2001, and Matecki 2010). Warmund cites issues with the methods of obtaining
parental consent stated in Section 312.5(b), such as the print-and-send method, which
was estimated to cost $2.81 per child (2000, p. 208). Matecki similarly cites the monetary
costs of complying with COPPA, stating that some estimate the total cost of COPPA
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compliance could reach upwards of $200,000 per year (2010, p. 382). Warmund (2000, p.
210-211) and Hersh (2001, p. 1866) both reason that the cost of compliance discourages
websites from offering their services to children. As mentioned previously in the context
of the YouTube settlement, these costs have been felt by smaller businesses, who struggle
to keep up with the legislation due to a lack of infrastructure and money.

That said, in the 2013 amendment, the Commission expanded the exceptions to the
Rule’s notice and consent requirements in § 312.5(c), such as that the Rule’s notice and
parental consent requirements does not apply when an operator collects only a personal
identifier only to support the operator’s internal operations (FTC 2013, p. 3977).
Moreover, the 2013 amendment also expanded the “non-exhaustive list” of acceptable
methods for obtaining prior verifiable parental consent, giving companies more options
(Id, p. 3972). While these updated definitions to the Rule relax some definitions for
companies in cases of internal operations and other exceptions and provide alternatives
methods of obtaining parental consent, the 2013 amendment fails to comprehensively
address the issue that small businesses may struggle more with compliance.
This thesis determines that the Rule’s first criticisms hold in some areas, though other issues with
the Rule have been addressed. In response to the criticism that COPPA is constitutionally
suspect, this thesis concludes that COPPA has not been challenged on First Amendment grounds,
so it is undetermined whether it would withstand strict scrutiny. Moreover, many of the issues in
precedents that made the CDA constitutionality suspect do not apply to COPPA. In addition, this
thesis finds that while verification technology has seen updates, COPPA compliance is still
difficult for smaller businesses.
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To What Extent Do Proposed Amendments Address COPPA’s Issues?
In investigating the enforcement actions and COPPA compliance in EdTech platforms, this
thesis has identified six additional issues of COPPA: a) reinforcement of disparities between
small and big businesses, b) the limitation of settlement, c) failing to empower minors as future
decision-makers, d) failing to meet legislative intent in empowering parents, and e) limitations of
“actual knowledge.” This thesis analyzes the proposed amendments to determine the extent to
which proposals will solve these issues.
Markey-Hawley (2019) and Markey-Cassidy (2021)

Originally introduced as the Markey-Hawley Bill in 2019, the amendment was introduced
by Sen. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.) and Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.). The Markey
Hawley Bill includes minors up to 15 years old, bans targeted marketing directed at
children, and allows parents and children to delete personal information posted online.
Moreover, it requires manufacturers of connected devices directed towards children to
create standardized and easy-to-understand privacy dashboards to inform the user of data
usage, transmission, retention, and protection practices. Additionally, it revises the
“actual knowledge” standard to be the “constructive knowledge” standard for operators
covered under COPPA, such that operators include those who would by reason of care
and due diligence should have known that they were collecting or maintaining personal
information from a child or minor. In the administration of COPPA, the Bill would
require the publishing of a report on the effectiveness of the safe harbor program and
establish a Youth Privacy and Marketing Division which would be responsible for
addressing COPPA and its amendments. Since its first introduction in 2019, the
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bipartisan bill died in committee. However, it was reintroduced in 2021 by Sen. Edward
J. Markey (D-Mass.) and Sen. Bill Cassidy (R-La.) and would rename the Rule to be the
“Children and Teens’ Online Privacy Protection Act.”

While COPPA currently requires operators to obtain verifiable parental consent prior to
utilizing children’s data in a commercial context, the Markey-Cassidy amendment would
completely ban targeted marketing directed at children, no matter whether verifiable
parental consent can be obtained. According to panelists at the 2019 FTC workshop,
behavioral or “targeted” advertising is a popular method of generating revenue.
Completely banning targeted marketing directed at children would reduce the number of
scenarios in which companies would have to obtain verifiable parental consent. By doing
so, the Bill may be implicitly addressing COPPA’s earlier criticisms about the difficulty
of obtaining effective meaningful parental consent.

The Markey-Cassidy Bill would add the ability for children to delete personal
information posted online, like the GDPR’s “right to be forgotten”. Currently, COPPA’s
data retention policy that states in § 312.10 Data retention and deletion requirements that
“An operator of a Web site or online service shall retain personal information collected
online from a child for only as long as is reasonably necessary to fulfill the purpose for
which the information was collected” (2013). By extending this requirement and giving
individuals the ability to delete personal information posted online, it would give children
greater control over their privacy and safety, which would address c) COPPA’s failure to
empower minors as future decision makers.
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Although the Markey-Cassidy Bill would require manufacturers of connected devices
directed towards children to create privacy dashboards, the Bill could further push for
improved readability and standardization of privacy statements for all online services.
Expanding the requirement to include all online services would be beneficial, as it would
also address c) COPPA’s failure to empower minors as future decision makers.

The constructive knowledge standard would expand the definition of operator to include
more companies who collect information from children, which may be thought to address
e) the limitations of the “actual knowledge” standard. The Bill defines seven scenarios in
which the operator would have constructive knowledge, though many of these are
implicit in COPPA’s definitions or enforcement actions. For example, Section
2(a)(2)(A)(v) of the Bill states, “the operator has or receives data or reporting or
information from the operator’s internal communications, including documentation about
its advertising practices… that indicates that data is being collected from users of a
particular age range that are using the product or service.” However, this is the exact
scenario that was used in the YouTube settlement case to determine that YouTube had
“actual knowledge”, as referenced as Exhibit A in the case (Case 1:19-cv-02642). While
the definitions make explicit the scenarios in which an operator would have actual
knowledge, it is unclear how the constructive knowledge standards will address the
limitations of actual knowledge.

Kids Online Safety Act (2022)

The Kids Online Safety Act (KOSA) was introduced in February 2022 by Sens. Richard
Blumenthal (D-Conn.) and Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.) after calls to require social
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media companies to increase transparency. KOSA was drafted to include any online
service of any size that is “reasonably likely to be used” by a child younger than 16. It
establishes a “duty of care” such that covered platforms have a duty to act in the best
interests of users who are minors, including a prevention of harm to minors. This would
include a duty to prevent and mitigate issues such as promotion of self-harm, suicide,
eating disorders, substance abuse, sexual exploitation, unlawful products and prevention
of stalking, exploitation, addiction, and rabbit holes of dangerous materials. These
safeguards would default to the strongest option by default and require parental tools to
be enabled by default. Additionally, KOSA would require disclosures for algorithmic
recommendation systems, advertising, and marketing, in addition to requiring resources
for parents and minors, annual audits by an independent third-party, a public report that
identifies risks of harm to minors, and access to data on harms to minors for research
purposes. In terms of administration, KOSA would require the FTC to establish
guidelines for covered platforms seeking to conduct market and product focused research
on minors, the National Institute of Standards and Technology to conduct a study
evaluating age verification technology, the FTC and Attorneys General to enforce the act,
and the Secretary of Commerce to establish and convene a Kids Online Safety Council to
provide advice on the act’s implementation.
KOSA includes any online service of any size that is “reasonably likely to be used” by a
child younger than 16, which would expand the age range covered by privacy and safety
protections. By expanding its definition to include such online services, it would likely
address e) the limitations of the actual knowledge standard. KOSA includes more
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websites used by children due to the absence of the “actual knowledge” standard,
especially those that have misrepresented their “actual knowledge.”

Some claim that increasing the age range of COPPA would raise issues with the First
Amendment. James Dunstan, General Counsel at TechFreedom, stated concerns
regarding COPPA expansion. Drawing parallels with Reno v. ACLU (1997), Dunstan
implied that expanding the age range for COPPA’s definition of children may similarly
restrict the legitimate right of adults to access legal content online and may be challenged
under the First Amendment. However, as noted in analysis of earlier criticisms, if the
legislation is challenged under the First Amendment, it can still withstand strict scrutiny.
As long as the government can demonstrate that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling governmental interest and that it is the least restrictive means of achieving
that objective, the legislation will withstand strict scrutiny (Legal Information Institute
n.d.).

Nevertheless, KOSA would address c) failure to empower minors as future decisionmakers and d) COPPA’s failure to meet legislative intent in empowering parents. By
requiring resources for parents and minors, KOSA is effectively empowering parents and
minors with more tools. For example, Section 4(b) would provide parental tools that
allow them to supervise their children’s use of platforms and Section 4(c) would give
minors and parents a dedicated reporting channel to alert the platform about harms and
requires them to respond in a timely manner.
The Markey-Cassidy Bill would address some of COPPA’s issues, including the difficulties of
obtaining verifiable parental consent, c) COPPA’s failure to empower minors as future decision-
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makers, though it does not address e) limitations of actual knowledge. On the other hand, the
Kids Online Safety Act would address the c) failing to empower minors as future decisionmakers, d) COPPA’s failure to meet legislative intent in empowering parents, e) limitations of
actual knowledge. However, as of March 2022, these are only bills, neither of which have gone
into effect. Moreover, neither of the proposals can effectively solve all COPPA’s issues,
especially those that originate from enforcement actions. The Commission should 1) consider
litigation and 2) ensure that they are holding small and big businesses accountable to the same
degree.
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CONCLUSION
In an effort to empower parents, the Federal Trade Commission enacted and adopted COPPA
more than 20 years ago. However, much of technology has changed since then and will continue
to change. Children’s lives have become increasingly intertwined with online goods and services,
such as Education Technology, and many concerns about their digital privacy and safety remain.
This thesis has determined that the Rule’s first criticisms hold in some areas, though other issues
with the Rule have been addressed. In response to the criticism that COPPA is constitutionally
suspect, this thesis concludes that COPPA has not been challenged on First Amendment grounds,
so it is undetermined whether it would withstand strict scrutiny. Moreover, many of the issues in
precedents that made the CDA constitutionality suspect do not apply to COPPA. In addition, this
thesis finds that while verification technology has seen updates, COPPA compliance is still
difficult for smaller businesses.
This thesis has also identified six additional issues in COPPA, enforcement actions, and
compliance: a) reinforcement of disparities between small and big businesses, b) the limitation of
settlement, c) failing to empower minors as future decision-makers, d) failing to meet legislative
intent in empowering parents, and e) limitations of “actual knowledge.”

In analyzing the Markey-Cassidy Bill (2021) and the Kids Online Safety Act, this thesis
concludes that neither bill can effectively solve all COPPA’s issues, especially those that
originate from enforcement actions. The Commission should 1) consider litigation and 2) ensure
that they are holding small and big businesses accountable to the same degree. However, this
thesis notes that both proposals make substantial improvements to the limitations of COPPA.
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These findings indicate that COPPA still falls short of the legislation’s intentions and fails to
meet the needs of various stakeholders. Technological development does not seem to slow, and
children are adopting technology at growing rates. However, operators, legislators, and the
Commission need to continue to work together to ensure that the online privacy needs of parents
and children are being met.
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